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Abstract 
We discuss evidence that the microcredit industry in Bangladesh has seen emergence of large 
variations in the size of the microfinance institutions operating in the market-- on the one hand, 
there are large national-level MFIs, while on the other hand, small localized MFIs operating only 
within the confines of a small area. Data from a recent  survey of Pathrail union in Tangail 
district, a seasoned place for microcredit,  reveals that within the local market competition is 
becoming more and more intense over time between established national-level MFIs and newly 
emerging local-level MFIs for market shares in terms of loan amount as well as borrowed 
members. Data reveals that there is market segmentation where some borrowers and MFIs opt for 
a package of low interest rates tied with low amount of loan disbursed and some other borrowers 
and MFIs settle for a package of high interest rates tied with high amount of loan disbursed. A 
Tobit regression estimation of member market shares in village micro credit market shows that 
size of the MFI, years of operation in the village, average loan size, deposit interest rates, loan 
amount disbursed for unique loan purposes (i.e., housing loan) are key determinants in  
determining MFI shares of a village microcredit market.    
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
In the industrial organization (IO) literature “market share” is a structure parameter. In parlance 
of IO, market structure indicators are important as these determine and define the scope for the 
firms to set their strategies, i.e. their conducts; upon which depends performance of a market 
structure, i.e. benefits or losses to the society emanating from such strategies. From society’s 
point of view what is of paramount importance is the existence of competition; as only in a 
perfectly competitive market structure an industry produces the socially optimal output. 
Possibility of competitive behavior among firms in turn depends on the lack of market power 
pertaining to any individual or a handful of firms operating within the industry. To be in an 
enviable position to command market power a firm or a handful of them must dominate the 
industry in terms of their shares in market output. Firms can exert market power also if they 
operate in a product differentiated segmented market. This is why studies of market share has had 
received much attention from the economists and had been subjected to studies for different 
industries (see Carlton and Perloff (2000)).  
 Microfinance industry has experienced considerable growth in the last three decades in 
different countries of the world. Although initially invented as a poverty alleviation tool by 
Mohammad Yunus in Bangladesh, in the last two decades in some parts of the world 
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microfinance has been carried as a pure profit-oriented business (see Roodman and Qureshi 
(2006)). Consequently, in addition to receiving funds from social investors (e.g. International 
Finance Corporation among others) -- microfinance industry has enjoyed access to private capital 
flow which has been primarily injected as investments to gain profit from this entire enterprise. 
Influx of capital from both private and public sources has led to increased competition among 
firms working in this industry. 
 Cross country experiences of development paths of microfinance industries are varied. 
Competition in the Latin American countries has taken a form where huge private capital has 
been attracted and injected into the microfinance firms. For example, in April 2007, Banco 
Compartamos of Mexico successfully offered Initial Public Offering (IPO) in which they sold 30 
percent of the bank’s share with a over subscription of 13 times (Cull, Kunt and Morduch 
(2009)). However, the reason its shares were rendered attractive in the first place was because it 
proved its activities to be satisfactorily profitable. It charges astronomical figures for interest rates 
to its micro borrowers, for example, at the time of the IPO offer, the borrowers were being 
charged interest rates as high as 94 percent per year of loans (inclusive of 15 percent value added 
tax). The Banco Compartamos is now successfully competing with other commercial banks to 
attract private equity. Supporters of Banco Comparatamos version of microfinance opine that this 
industry can and should compete with mainstream commercial banks, competing for billions of 
dollars on global capital markets (op. cit.). 
 This type of microfinance banking in Latin America is diametrically opposite to what 
would be approved of by the microcredit pioneer Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh in the South Asia region (see Yunus (2007)). In Bangladesh competition in this 
industry has taken a shape where the microfinance institutions are largely in competition within 
themselves and not with banks or other financial institutions in attracting borrowers. The industry 
has enjoyed good influx of capital but from social investors, donor countries and the government 
only. In Bangladesh the dominant thinking is to view microfinance as a socially responsible 
business with an aim to alleviate poverty. That is why interest rates charged by different 
microfinance firms, albeit higher than commercial banks, is kept within a range not exceeding a 
level one third of that of the Banco Compartamos, for example. These two examples from two 
different regions of the world are representative of divergent paths being followed by 
microfinance institutions across the globe.  
 Even if we keep our focus within the kind of competition that is observed in Bangladesh, 
different ramifications are possible. For example, one possibility is that a handful of large 
microfinance institutions may consolidate themselves in the industry by driving out small ones. A 
second possibility is that in major areas both national level large and local level small 
microfinance firms may operate side by side where no single firm could maintain any 
considerable share of the market. Yet another possibility is that large NGOs aim at the poorest of 
the households while the localized and relatively small NGOs cater for a segmented market where 
they serve the most productive households only. We can think of few others. It is not obvious if 
any of them deserves unqualified approval.  
 Whether a specific form of competition should raise concerns for the industry and the 
society as a whole will depend not only on the nature of competition but also on the specific 
strategies pursued by the microfinance firms that led to a given market structure.4 In the current 
study we want to look into the driving forces that propelled the changes in market shares in the 
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microfinance industry in Bangladesh; this in turn facilitates our understanding as to whether the 
development we observe in Bangladesh microfinance industry is ominous or wholesome. 
 The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the background and 
motivation, whilst Section 3 specifies the research question and Section 4 is an overview of 
relevant literature. Section 5 analyzes the data. Section 6 sets an econometric model and discusses 
estimations from the econometric exercise. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
Section 2: Background and Motivation 
Section 2.1: National-level Information from MRA 
Recent national-level information of Bangladesh microfinance market is available in the 
publications of Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), such as the MRA (2008) compilation. 
The GoB has made it mandatory for MFIs who have microcredit activities to apply for license 
with MRA. A total of 4236 NGO-MFIs applied for license within a specified time-frame and out 
of them, 641 NGO-MFIs have been primarily selected. Table 1 is a summary of authors’ 
calculation based on these 641 NGO-MFIs documented in MRA (2008).  
Table 1 Differences within NGO-MFI sector in 2006, Bangladesh national-level data 
  Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg. 
Type NGO-MFIs Dist Upazila Branch Employ Mem Borro Mem Borro Loan 
     /Branch /Emp /Emp /Bran /Bran /Borro 
VL ASA+BRAC 64.00 n.a. 2674.00 10.99 198.36 156.43 2180.84 1719.90 4822.01
L 10 25.10 99.10 181.50 10.07 138.53 114.54 1395.41 1153.76 8788.17
M 15 9.87 36.13 59.27 18.14 75.16 61.14 1363.07 1108.81 4298.52
S 92 4.91 13.58 20.92 18.26 75.32 53.15 1375.16 970.40 4224.51
VS 521 1.67 3.02 3.78 15.30 67.73 47.04 1036.21 719.69 3903.22
Total 641          
Note:           
Proshika (in VL category) not included in calculation for typo; Grameen Bank not included in the list 
VL:Very Large: Borrowers More than or Equal to 1 Million      
L: Large: Borrowers More than or Equal to 100 Thousand but Less than 1 Million    
M: Medium: Borrowers More than or Equal to 50 Thousand but Less than 100 Thousand   
S: Small: Borrowers More than or Equal to 10 Thousand but Less than 50 Thousand   
VS: Very Small: Borrowers Less than 50 Thousand           
Source: MRA (2008), Authors' Calculations       
Table 1 includes almost all major players in the national NGO-MFI market. We notice 
that the there is a huge variation among the MFIs in terms of coverage. While “very large” 
category MFIs cover (a total of three in the original list, namely, BRAC, ASA and Proshika, list 
does not include Grameen Bank) nearly all over the country comprising of 64 districts, a “very 
small” category MFI covers, on average, only 1.67 districts and 3.02 upazilas (sub-districts). 
Very large MFIs operate thousands of branches whilst very small MFIs operate only a few of 
them, typically in a contiguous area. Taking into consideration possibility of purposive 
misreporting of MFIs to the regulatory authority, we notice that extent of coverage of branches is 
hugely different: a typical very large MFI branch employee covers 198 members and, of them, 
156 borrowers, whilst a typical very small MFI branch employee covers only 68 members and, of 
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them, 47 borrowers. This can be explained by possible constraints of very small MFIs on the 
demand side, or the supply side, or both. With regards to loan amount disbursement, while a very 
small local MFI (fifth category) offers a smaller loan amount compared to a large national-level 
MFI (second category), interestingly loan amount offers by very large MFIs (first category) are 
closer to those offered by the very small MFIs (fifth category).  
Section 2.2: Local-level Information from PKSF-InM census in Pathrail union, Tangail 
Palli Karma Shahayak Foundation (PKSF) and Institute of Microfinance (InM) jointly conducted 
a census of microcredit borrowers at Pathrail union in Delduar upazila of Tangail district in the 
months of March and April in 2007-- the objective of the census was to examine overlapping 
pattern among the microcredit borrowers. Only one union within the district was chosen in order 
to conduct a thorough census of the area under consideration.  Pathrail union has 23 villages. All 
the villages had some microfinance programs conducted at varied extents. This district was 
chosen for census as this, as already mentioned, is one of the seasoned places in Bangladesh 
where microcredit program began as early as in the late 1970s. Although it is likely that the 
consolidation is far from complete in the microfinance industry here, given the fact that it has a 
long history of microfinance activity, through years of development, it has grown to certain 
maturity and therefore is likely to be indicative of where the microfinance industry is heading for; 
furthermore whatever development we observe here will possibly be followed in the rest of the 
country in course of time.  
 
Section 3: Research Question 
 
The objective of the paper is to examine nature of competition in the microfinance market in 
Bangladesh, as it is being evolved over time. The research question is: how the microfinance 
market is evolving over time, given that substantial differences exists among the NGO-MFIs in 
terms of overall size of organization, coverage of localities, members and borrowers, amount of 
loan being offered, nature of loan products that are being offered, etc.?  
 
Section 4: Overview of Literature 
 
We consult here papers and documents that deal with different aspects of microcredit market in 
Bangladesh in the 2000s.  
Chaudhury and Matin (2002) studies overlapping phenomenon in the Tangail district. 
They conducted an exploratory study based on BRAC’s operations in 9 villages in 2 upazilas of 
Tangail on a sample of 240 households. From these households they collected NGO participation 
and loan related information for 3 consecutive years. The aim of the study was to find out reasons 
behind and consequences of overlapping by households. They conclude that occurrence of 
unexpected crisis is the main reason behind households looking for multiple loans from different 
MFIs. They found increased incidence of repayment irregularity by borrowers; however, defaults 
within their sample did not take alarming proportion; suggesting overlapping households 
managed to pay back their dues timely or with some delays. Given their findings regarding the 
cause of overlapping their conclusion was that MFIs needed to come up with risk-responsive 
loans so that borrowers would not be forced to borrow from multiple organizations to pay back 
their dues to the MFI they initially borrowed from. 
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 Meyer (2002) discusses recent problems in Bangladesh microfinance market such as high 
dropout rates, exclusion and non-participation, evidence of unmet demand, delinquencies and 
defaults, overlap, inflexible product characteristics and product design, etc. He comments that a 
huge expansion of microfinance in Bangladesh has taken place which has led to intense 
competition for clients and some have commented that this will undermine the industry. Within 
the industry, repayment discipline is declining, as clients are increasingly willing to default with 
one MFI confident in the belief that a competing MFI will make a follow-on loan. Meyer points 
out that MFIs in Bangladesh must move beyond the first phase of “one size fits all” standardized 
microlending towards a second phase with more flexible financial policies and products to match 
with client demands and preferences. 
Matin (undated) in a CGAP research brief provides some key observations on MFI 
competition in Bangladesh around the early 2000s. The most prominent feature of MFI 
competition that emerged is “overlapping”, a term used to imply “multiple microfinance 
membership at the level of the household”. Measurement of overlapping is difficult since most 
MFIs keep records at individual client levels, not at household levels; but overlapping occurs at 
household levels as well. Most MFI staff covered in the survey did not claim that overlapping led 
to any considerable drop in repayment rates, at least presently; yet they were worried about a long 
term relationship between overlapping and low repayments. They viewed overlapping to be 
principally caused by repayment difficulties of households or their needs to cross-finance and 
manage repayments or in some cases attempts by households for higher credit amount. Matin 
summarized interesting contrasts of large MFIs vis-à-vis small MFIs. Large national-level MFIs 
or some district-level MFIs often provided much larger first-time and more progressive loans, and 
gave quicker repeat loans; as compared to smaller MFIs. On the other hand, advantage of small 
MFIs was in employing local field staff, therefore enjoying comparative advantages in enforcing 
loan contracts and repayments. Both small and large MFIs made complaints regarding each other, 
while small ones complained that their long-term clients were being taken over by large ones; at 
the same time, large ones complained that their clients were being provided with additional loans 
by small ones, thereby causing problems of loan repayments. Matin made interesting observation 
about competition practices of later entrants into some already crowded areas: field staff was 
being handed over preset targets from head offices; this led to field staff’s aggressive marketing 
practices including consciously ignoring household’s debt obligation records.  
Uddin (undated) is a note that summarizes experiences from the field of recent issues in 
microfinance industry. Uddin points out explanations for multiple memberships or overlapping 
issue. From the loan receivers’ side, overlapping is principally caused by mismatch of loan 
specifications demanded by loan receivers and those sanctioned by MFIs. From the supply side, 
overlapping is principally caused by formation of incompatible groups compared with availability 
of loan fund, unplanned expansion of the credit program at field level at the instruction of head 
office without conducting any feasibility study and a motive to mobilize high amount of savings 
to finance credit programs. All organizations want to concentrate in specific geographical areas 
with good communication facilities and financial robustness, and not many organizations are 
actually willing to expand their operations in remote areas since they may not have the required 
logistical support to operate there.   
Charitonenko and Rahman (2002) analyze progress toward commercialization of 
Bangladesh’s relatively well-developed and diversified microfinance industry. The term 
commercialization implies “the application of market-based principles to microfinance”. At the 
micro level, commercialization implies institutional progress along a continuum, such as, firstly, 
adoption of for-profit orientation in administration and operation, such as developing diversified, 
demand-driven financial products applying cost-recovery interest rates; secondly, progression 
towards operational and financial self-sufficiency; thirdly, use of market-based, non-subsidized 
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sources for funds; and finally, operation as a for-profit, formal financial institution under 
regulation, and being able to attract equity investment. The report assesses that while general 
improvement of NGO-MFIs within the microfinance industry in terms of financial self-
sufficiency are promising, this industry is far from reaching “potential benefits” of 
commercialization. Until there is adequate legal and regulatory framework and greater access to 
commercial sources for funds, MFIs may have few incentives to commercialize their operations 
further. The outcome of industry remaining not commercialized, the report suggests, is that MFIs’ 
growth will be limited, and client savings will remain at risk. 
Zaman (2004) describes the factors that led to rapid expansion of the microcredit sector 
in Bangladesh based on an overview of experiences of last three decades, and lessons for other 
countries from this experience. These are as follows. Firstly, an “enabling environment” for 
microcredit where both interest rates and inflation rates were kept at reasonable level in the 
national macroeconomic level helped microcredit industry in the microeconomic level. Secondly, 
microcredit turned out to be more effective in reducing household vulnerability for the poorest 
when it was combined with other interventions. Thirdly, donor financial assistance particularly 
during the “infant” stage of a number of MFIs helped consolidate their organizational structure 
over time. Fourthly, a decentralized decision-making system combined with client feedback and 
program monitoring helped many MFIs in Bangladesh in building soild organizational structure. 
Fifthly, while an apex body for channeling funds into MFIs helped the industry; these funds 
needed to be synchronized with the needs of growing MFIs. Finally, since only four organizations 
were currently serving nearly ninety percent of microcredit borrowers, one lesson could be that a 
large number of MFIs are not required to be supported in order to reach a large proportion of poor 
people. Yet one need to consider probable repercussion regarding only a few MFIs being 
encouraged to operate-- in that situation, internal weaknesses in any one organization would 
translate into problems for the entire industry. Zaman points out that during the early years of 
microcredit in the country, the organizational model of a NGO-MFI in the industry was of a 
“franchise”-- virtually identical field offices with similar work pattern and product delivery, this 
could happen because relatively simple loan products and services were being offered at the 
beginning. Only when this rapid expansion phase was over, MFIs started to offer more diversified 
loan products and services targeting different niche markets. 
   
Section 5: Data 
 
Section 5.1 Structure of Data 
We analyze data from the PKSF-InM jointly conducted census of Pathrail union microcredit 
borrowers. The census had four modules of questionnaire. The first module is administered for 
every single household in the union for listing purposes, asking basic information with regards to 
landholding, NGO-MFI membership status, etc. (Module 1: listing questionnaire). The second 
module is a village survey questionnaire, administered in focus group discussions held in each 
village in order to reach consensus opinion-- questions were mostly on physical infrastructure of 
the villages and distance from important locations, e.g., paved road, post office, union parishad 
headquarters, upazila parishad headquarters, school, bank, college, health center, bazaar, etc. 
(Module 2: village questionnaire). The third module is administered among branch managers and 
field workers of NGO-MFIs-- questions mostly on the issues of competition practices of MFIs 
and overlapping situation (Module 3: NGO-MFI questionnaire). The fourth module was a 
detailed household questionnaire, only for households who are members and/or borrowers of 
NGO-MFIs (Module 4: household questionnaire). A total of 4,496 household interviews were 
recorded with Module 4.   
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This fourth module includes listing of all NGO-MFIs and loan types that household 
members have taken loan from since inception of microcredit in this area in 1979. For every 
single NGO-MFI loan taken by the household, the questionnaire records details of loan amount 
demanded, loan amount disbursed, purpose of loan, utilization of loan, date of loan sanctioning, 
name of MFI-NGO from which loan has been taken, etc. Since Module 4 has NGO-MFI loan 
history of all the households in the village who ever participated in the microcredit market-- it is 
possible to construct a village-level panel data set from combining household information up to 
the village level. Since concerns may arise regarding correctness of long recall, we analyzed the 
data only within a specific time frame-- years 2000 to 2006 (household interviews were 
conducted on March-April of 2007, so this year was yet to get completed, therefore we did not 
include this year in our analysis).  
The list from Module 4 includes formal sources such as banks and MFIs and informal 
sources such as commercial money lenders, neighbors and rich farmers in the village. We 
selected a total of 43 NGO-MFIs from among 65 numbers of sources of credit funds for 
household (not selected are categories outside the scope of microcredit market). We classified 
MFIs in three size categories: “large”, “medium” and “small”. We consulted PKSF documents for 
years 2000 to 2006 to ascertain which MFI would be placed in which category. We placed 7 
MFIs as “large” ones (namely BRAC, ASA, Proshika, Grameen Bank, BRDB, PDBF and BURO 
Tangail); 2 MFIs as “medium” ones (namely SSS and SATU) and 34 MFIs as “small” ones (these 
did not receive funds from PKSF, and typically these were small in size and local in terms of 
microcredit operations). We defined “market share of borrowers” as the share of the village 
microcredit borrowers that went to a particular MFI in a given year; and we defined “market 
share of loan amount” as the share of the village total microcredit loan disbursed in a given year 
that went to a particular MFI. Combining all the market shares of a particular MFI across all the 
villages in terms of borrowers and loan amount disbursed, we have “grand total market share of 
borrowers” and “grand total market share of loan amount disbursed”, respectively for each year. 
We note that while we analyze data from 2000 to 2006, for econometric exercise, we use only 
data of 2006 (see Section 6.1).   
 
Section 5.2 Analysis of Data
Section 5.2.1: Industry Concentration 
Measure of industry concentration, such as the normalized Herfindahl index, for microcredit 
market of NGO-MFIs in villages of Pathrail during 2000 to 2006 exhibits that market 
concentration is gradually eroding over time (see Annex 1). Whereas in 2000, values of 
normalized Herfindahl index for market share of microcredit loans and microcredit borrowers of 
NGO-MFIs across all villages were 0.31 and 0.25 respectively; these values gradually declined to 
0.14 and 0.13 respectively by the year 2006 (in a scale of 0 to 1). This implies that the microcredit 
market is becoming increasingly more competitive over time.  
Section 5.2.2: Long term trends 
For examination of increasing competitiveness in the industry, we get into details of data further 
and find some interesting features. We see that over the period small NGOs have gained in terms 
of numbers and in their combined market shares. The number of NGOs working in these villages 
have increased for all the size categories; the remarkable part of it is the fact that small NGOs, 
absent in most of the villages a few years earlier, have increased their presence in the union and 
have collectively gradually eroded market shares of large ones. We make these observations in 
Figures 1, 2 and 3. 
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 Figure 1 depicts the numbers of NGOs working in the Pathrail union since 1979, 
classified into three groups-- large, medium and small. It shows that it is the large NGOs (in fact 
it is Grameen Bank, which is technically a specialized bank) that started their activity first in the 
union in 1979. Medium NGOs did not start their credit activity regularly until 1990. Small 
localized NGOs showed up in the picture much later in 1994; ever since these small NGOs have 
gained in terms of numbers in the union. While in 1994 only one small NGO conducted its credit 
activity, during the time of census in 2007 their number increased to 33 in the entire union. 
Figure 1 Numbers of NGOs working in the Pathrail union, NGO types, 1979-2007 
 
 Numbers of NGOs working in the Pathrail union by NGO types, 
1979-2007
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
 The numbers only, of the NGOs overtime, may be misleading in expressing the true 
extent and relative importance of these three size categories of NGOs. Figures 2 and 3 have been 
drawn to manifest market share distributions of these three groups of NGOs. Figure 2 depicts the 
combined market shares of the NGOs separated into three groups-- market shares are computed 
on the basis of loan disbursed by the NGOs. As we approach 2007, the market shares of the large 
group show a steady decline and contrary to that market share of the small group rises to almost 
20 percent of the market. The same story can be read from Figure 3; which distinguishes itself 
from Figure 2 only by the fact that the market shares in this figure are computed on the basis of 
the numbers of active borrowing members in a year belonging to the respective group of NGOs. 
Here also moving towards 2007 manifests a continuous soaring of the small group market shares, 
at the expense of the large group.5  
                                                 
5  One weakness of the data used in Figures 1-3, is that they are based on recalls of the active borrowers 
who still lived in the area in 2007; furthermore, some of the households may have left the area ever since 
micro lending started in the late 70s. None of the reasons is robust enough to change the pattern reflected 
in these figures though. 
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Figure 2 Market Share of Loan Disbursed, by NGO types, in Pathrail union, 1979-2007 
 
 
Market share in terms of loan disbursed by NGO_types 
in Pathrail union, 1979-2007
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Figure 3 Market Share of Borrowed Members, NGO type, in Pathrail union,  
               1979-2007 
 
 What are we to read from this feature of the MFI market in Pathrail? Does it reveal that 
microcredit market has become increasingly competitive over time? Or is it the case that the large 
NGOs due to supply constraints could not cover enough demand and the new, localized small 
MFIs made use of that opportunity and flourished? Could it be the case that in addition to make 
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use of untouched potentials, small NGOs are working in a segmented market where their chief 
strategy is to allure the higher productive borrowers? In other words, is it the case that, as the 
market has gotten mature many small players have recognized scopes for pure-profit 
commercialization of the micro credit market and have encroached in it gradually? 
 These different scenarios have different implications. The particular growth of small 
lenders can be boon or bane for the microfinance industry as a whole depending on reasons that 
led to and the consequences that followed from the actions of these lenders. The growth can be 
regarded as innocuous if it took place mainly through tapping the unsaturated markets in the area 
by these small lenders. In that case it is just a case of efficient functioning of the market system. 
However, if the growth mainly depended on overlapping6 by the lenders then that can raise 
concern. That is so as indebtedness is a possible effect of overlapping and poses threat to the 
financial system through concomitant rise in portfolio risk. However, overlapping can also be a 
necessity and therefore wholesome if it was primarily due to filling the gap between insufficient 
sizes of individual loans provided by the large NGOs and corresponding correctly assessed 
demand for loan. If we find that household net worth is increasing over time and on a sustainable 
basis, even when this household overlaps, we may conclude that overlapping actually helped 
these households. In that case, we may say that overlapping can help borrowers taking higher 
productive activity by enlarging investments.  
 It is possible that the small MFIs are increasing their market share by targeting segmented 
markets; this way they are increasing their share by alluring the most productive borrowers. One 
way to accomplish this is by offering larger loan amount; this in turn helps the borrowers to 
invest in more productive assets or enable them to carry through larger expansion of their 
businesses.  
 Recognizing and treating micro credit as a business and providing loans with a pure profit 
motive with less strings attached may also help some MFIs gain in market shares.7 It may be 
mentioned that micro credit as a subsidized program competes with other public programs aimed 
at alleviating poverty. Seen from this perspective, if the lending rules incorporate such conviction, 
then lending becomes relatively less business oriented and constrained for the lending 
organization. For example, in that case a lending organization would aim at maximizing number 
of households rather than outstanding loan amount and stay away from overlapping; be it 
household- or membership overlap. The aim would be to reach as many poor households as 
possible, to help them graduate out of poverty than pursuing primarily financial goals of 
maximizing profit or return. Keeping the poverty alleviation aim in mind a lending organization 
would also keep away from market segmentation in the sense mentioned above.  
Section 5.2.3: Characteristic differences between large and small NGOs 
The fact that surfaces from the discussion of the previous subsection is that the large NGOs are 
facing increasing competition from the small NGOs to attract borrowers in the market. Yet the 
market is far away from consolidation. This we can be read from Table 2 which shows that the 
                                                 
6 Overlapping is defined in this paper in two ways, one is “household overlapping” and the other one is 
“membership overlapping”. Any household with more than one member is termed an overlapping 
household. On the other hand, an individual having membership with more than one institution is termed 
as an overlapping member. Notice that membership overlapping is thus defined to be a subset of 
household overlapping, so it is always that case that in any village household overlapping number is 
higher as compared to membership overlapping.    
7 Micro credit operations in rural areas traditionally come with a host of additional social responsibilities 
that the borrowers must adhere to. A pure profit motive business oriented micro credit business may 
make itself attractive by keeping such imperatives at bay. 
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combined numbers and growth rates of active borrower member loan cases for the large NGOs 
have been growing even for the recent years. In this expansion large firms must face competition 
from the small NGOs simply because presence of so many sources of fund gives a new borrower 
large option to choose from. Furthermore, in our data we have found evidence of increasing 
number of cases of both household and membership overlapping at village levels; this indicates 
that even a current member can be allured away. This brings us the relevance of the question that 
considering the characteristics of the MFIs in Patrail are there distinctive differences that separate 
their behavior across the groups? In the next few paragraphs we have tried to address this 
question with the help of descriptive statistics. In the following discussion within the current 
section we will look into some characteristics differences, if any, which may affect borrowers’ 
decisions. 
Table 2 Numbers and Growth Rates of Borrowed Member Cases for Large, Medium & 
Small NGOs in Pathrail union, 2000- 2006 
Year Large NGO Medium NGO Small NGO 
 Nos. of 
borrowing 
member 
cases  
Growth of 
member 
cases 
(%) 
Nos. of 
borrowing 
member 
cases  
Growth of 
member 
cases 
(%) 
Nos. of 
borrowing 
member 
cases  
Growth of 
member 
cases 
(%) 
2000 850 -- 212 -- 34 -- 
2001 984 16% 256 21% 49 44% 
2002 1192 21% 355 39% 89 82% 
2003 1531 28% 444 25% 131 47% 
2004 2228 46% 591 33% 245 87% 
2005 3043 37% 793 34% 463 89% 
2006 3764 24% 1046 32% 737 59% 
Figure 4 and 5 depict the differences in average loan sizes and nominal interest rates 
charged, by the large and small NGOs from year 2000 through 2006.8 A palpable difference in 
average loan provided manifests itself in Figure 4. It shows that generally small NGOs offer 
larger size loans than their larger counterparts (though not necessarily correct for every year and 
situation may differ across different villages, see subsection 5.2.4). From year 2004 loan sizes of 
both the groups have steadily increased; but for the small group the increase is larger in extent. In 
2005 the average loan size for the large group of NGOs was Tk.9732 which increased to Tk 
10,583 in 2006. For the small group of NGOs the amounts for the same period were, Tk 11,080 
and 13,085, respectively. Small group of NGOs charge higher average nominal interests than the 
large group of NGOs. From Figure 5 we see that for all the years shown, average nominal interest 
rates for the large group of NGOs remain below 13 percent; while for the small group it never fell 
below 15 percent. Since year 2004, however, interest rates for the small group of NGOs show 
steady downward decline; still in year 2006 the gap remains around 3.5 percentage points in favor 
of the small group of NGOs.  
                                                 
8 To emphasize our observation the differences between only the large and small groups have been shown. 
Another reason to leave out middle group is that there are only 2 firms in that group. In any case, their 
position is in between the large and the small groups, in terms of the variables in Figures 4 and 5. 
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Figure 4 Comparison of Average Loan Sizes lent by the Large and Small MFIs in Pathrail 
union, 2000-2006 
 
Comparison of average loan sizes lent by the large and small 
MFIs in Pathrail union, 2000-2006
Figure 5 Comparison of Average Nominal Interest Rates Charged by the Large and Small 
MFIs in Pathrail union, 2000-2006 
 
 It is possible that, from the supply side, because of economies of scale advantages, large 
MFIs can reduce interest rates, but small MFIs find this option difficult. Yet increasing 
competition in the market would create pressures on MFIs to reduce interest rates (additionally 
restrictions on MFIs who receive funds from PKSF forced some of them to follow lower nominal 
interest rates). We can add that large average loan sizes per member may help small MFIs in 
keeping transaction costs and thus costs of operation low (by reaching out to lower number of 
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active clients). It is possible that, from the demand side, larger loan size allows borrowers from 
the small NGOs to invest in larger size and/or higher productive activities; which in turn makes it 
possible to pay back at a higher rate. As a result the demand for and supply of larger amount but 
costlier loans exists. To check if that is likely to be the case, next we explore the status of micro-
enterprise loans in the portfolio of these two groups.9
 Table 3 lists the proportion of loan portfolio extended for micro-enterprise loans, across 
size groups. For the years 2000 through 2006 it shows that generally the small NGOs tend to 
earmark larger share of their portfolio for micro-enterprise loans. As can be seen, however, the 
magnitudes of the shares are not large. The difference therefore is not considerable enough. Also 
the gaps between the small and large NGOs in this respect narrowed as the large NGOs have been 
increasing share of their loan portfolio for micro-enterprises in recent years. Although not 
decisively conclusive from the data presented in Table 3, the changes occurring for the large 
NGOs indicate that probably the large NGOs, facing competition from the small group of NGOs, 
felt the need to increase micro-enterprise loans in their portfolio and acted accordingly. 
Table 3 Proportion of Micro-enterprise Loans in Loan Portfolio, 2000- 2006 
Source: Census data on Pathrail (2007) 
Year Large MFI Medium MFI Small MFI 
2000 0.6% 0.0% 5.6% 
2001 1.0% 0.8% 2.0% 
2002 1.7% 1.4% 4.2% 
2003 1.7% 2.4% 4.4% 
2004 2.4% 2.9% 4.4% 
2005 3.4% 4.3% 5.8% 
2006 4.2% 5.7% 6.5% 
 Do large and small NGOs differ in terms of purpose of loans used? Table 4 lists the 
proportion of three most important purposes (reported by the borrowers as “purposes” for 
applying for loans) for which the disbursed loans were sanctioned by the NGOs in the years from 
2000 through 2006. The table shows that for the Pathrail union by far the most important purpose 
of loan taken is handloom categories. This is plausible since cottage and handloom industry is 
widespread here in this area and is a source of significant employment and earnings. Accordingly 
any microfinance institution in Pathrail finds a natural source of demand for loan for the 
handloom and cottage industry. From the census data we find that, land cultivation and saree 
trade are other two important use of microcredit in Pathrail. We do not find any significant 
differences in loan portfolios in terms of purpose of loan borrowed with respect to NGO size 
categories. As we approach 2006 small NGOs tend to have converged towards large NGOs in this 
respect. 
                                                 
9 Loans with size at or above Tk.30,000 are regarded as micro-enterprise loans. It differs from IGA (Income 
Generating Activity) loans in terms of size and it is rarely provided to new borrowers by the NGOs. 
 
 
13
Table 4 Comparison of loan portfolio between large and small NGOs, 2000- 200610
Year Large MFIs Small MFIs
 Purpose of loan taken 
Proportion in 
loan portfolio 
(%) 
Purpose of loan 
taken 
Proportion in 
loan portfolio 
(%) 
 handloom 0.38 handloom 0.58 
2000 land cultivation 0.18 saree trade 0.11 
 small business 0.07 land cultivation 0.08 
 handloom 0.39 handloom 0.49 
2001 land cultivation 0.14 land cultivation 0.10 
 small business 0.07 saree trade 0.08 
 handloom 0.37 handloom 0.41 
2002 land cultivation 0.16 land cultivation 0.14 
 small business 0.08 small business 0.08 
 handloom 0.35 handloom 0.38 
2003 land cultivation 0.17 land cultivation 0.09 
 small business 0.09 small business 0.08 
 handloom 0.36 handloom 0.39 
2004 land cultivation 0.16 small business 0.08 
 small business 0.10 saree trade 0.08 
 handloom 0.34 handloom 0.31 
2005 land cultivation 0.16 land cultivation 0.11 
 small business 0.09 small business 0.10 
 handloom 0.33 handloom 0.33 
2006 land cultivation 0.15 land cultivation 0.09 
 small business 0.09 small business 0.08 
Source: Census data on Pathrail (2007) 
 What we can reasonably summarize from our discussion so far is that providing larger 
size micro-enterprise loans played a role in small NGOs gaining shares in the micro credit market 
in Patrail. This also allowed them to charge higher interest rates and therefore have scope for 
earning higher profits in turn. If that is the case then these NGOs might have preferred 
maximizing outstanding credit rather than number of households. But the above discussion can at 
the best be indicative and not conclusive. In the next two subsections, we will analyze the issue in 
terms of individual MFIs and village microcredit markets, respectively.   
Section 5.2.3: Market shares, Average Loans and Interest Rates of MFIs 
 
Annex 2 lists the market shares of members and market shares of borrowers for all MFIs during 
2000 to 2006 summing across all the villages in the union. Annex 3 lists the average loan 
amounts and average nominal interest rates for all MFIs. 
In Annex 2 we notice that some MFIs have registered gains in member and loan shares in 
the union, some have registered losses, but for most of the MFIs the change is not very 
noticeable. Annex 2 and 3 help us gain an understanding of how this share has changed for a MFI 
by giving us the three interrelated product characteristics, such as, average loan size and average 
nominal interest rate. The biggest fall in market shares both in union member market and in union 
                                                 
10 In table 4 only the purposes pertaining to three top most shares have been listed. For all years these three 
purposes cover over 50 percent of total loan disbursed.  
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loan market occurred to Grameen Bank, from around 52% in 2000, it has been reduced to around 
32% in union market shares within seven years, by 2006. Grameen sanctioned a reasonable 
increase in its’ average loan size over time, and it has kept its’ nominal average interest rates at a 
low level. It is possible that Grameen has been less aggressive in preserving its’ market shares, 
compared to its’ competitors. We note that even though Grameen has lost in market share, it has 
increased total loan disbursed in the market quite satisfactorily since the overall market size in the 
union has increased within this time. ASA has gained market shares, from around 2% in 2000 to 
around 7% in 2006 and BRAC has also gained some shares in Pathrail union, from around 4% in 
2000 to around 7% in 2006. ASA has increased its’ average loan amount from TK. 4,786 in 2000 
to TK. 7,661 in 2006; BRAC has increased its’ average loan amount from TK. 4,260 in 2000 to 
TK. 10,987 in 2006. Compared to a low start, this increase in loan amounts over time is 
noticeable. SSS and SATU have maintained around 12% and 8% of the market, respectively; both 
of them have also managed to disburse larger average loan amounts over time, and the increases 
in loan amounts are noticeable. Among the small MFI category, three MFIs turn out to be 
noticeable in expansion; these are Ananda, Jojona and Shamajik Sheba Songothon. Ananda in 
2000 had only a meager 0.10% share, it managed to move up to 2.60% share in 2006; this can be 
partly explained by a sharp increase in average loan amount from only TK. 2,500 to TK. 11,959 
within these seven years. Jojona in 2000 had only 0.53% share, it rose up to 2.94% share in 2006; 
this can be partly explained by a sharp increase in average loan amount from only TK. 4,667 to 
TK. 14,238 within seven years. Shamajik Sheba Songothon also gained market share from a low 
1% to around 2.5%; interestingly Shamajik Sheba Songothon sanctioned high amount of average 
loan amount combined with high nominal interest rates from the outset and continued to keep its 
tradition till end, though there were fluctuations in figures, while in 2000, its’ average loan 
amount was TK. 14,909 (interest rate 17.55%), in 2006, its’ loan amount still was TK. 15,413 
(interest rate 17.62%). We can summarize our analysis here by noting that gains in market shares 
mostly comes from a higher average loan amount (tied with higher interest rate) to be offered by 
an MFI as compared to those being offered by its competitors; and therefore a large sum of fund 
is necessary to gain additional shares in the microcredit market. Implication from this is that it 
would be easier for large MFIs to generate the required fund and gain additional shares in the 
market, compared to small MFIs, because of nation-wide financing network. Again it is possible 
for small MFIs to gain shares in markets by concentrating on some particular locations (see 
subsection 5.2.4), rather than the whole union or bigger regions. Yet we note that whether an MFI 
would act aggressively in a particular market actually depends on the decisions made in its’ head 
office, whether the head office considers this market worthwhile or not, or whether it requires 
program to expand in that location or not, or whether it has enough funds for gaining market 
shares, etc.  
 
Section 5.2.4 MFI Participation in Village Microcredit Markets 
 
Table 5 exhibits changes in the number of MFIs in each village of Pathrail union by NGO type. 
Most of the small MFIs are late entrants into the village microcredit markets, whereas large and 
medium MFIs were operating over there already in most of the villages. 
 
 
15
Table 5 Number of NGO-MFIs operating in Village Microcredit Markets, by NGO type, 
2000- 2006 
village ngotype 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Nolshuda Big & Medium (9) 6 6 6 6 7 7 8
Small (34) 3 3 3 6 8 10 10
Shuvki Big & Medium (9) 5 6 7 7 7 8 8
Small (34) 1 0 2 2 3 7 9
Bishnupur Big & Medium (9) 3 5 5 6 6 6 6
Small (34) 2 1 3 2 6 6 9
Tarini Big & Medium (9) 6 5 6 6 7 7 7
Small (34) 0 1 1 1 1 2 5
Bakultola Big & Medium (9) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Small (34) 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Arra Big & Medium (9) 0 0 2 2 2 4 4
Small (34) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Narunda Big & Medium (9) 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
Small (34) 0 1 3 5 7 9 9
Deojan Big & Medium (9) 6 7 7 7 7 7 9
Small (34) 3 3 4 6 6 7 11
Borotia Big & Medium (9) 5 6 6 7 7 7 7
Small (34) 1 1 2 2 2 2 3
Kumuria Big & Medium (9) 4 4 5 5 5 5 6
Small (34) 0 1 1 1 1 1 2
Gadtola Big & Medium (9) 6 4 7 7 7 7 8
Small (34) 1 1 0 1 2 2 2
Bandabari Big & Medium (9) 3 3 3 4 4 5 5
Small (34) 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
Parijatpur Big & Medium (9) 6 6 5 6 8 8 8
Small (34) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chandi Big & Medium (9) 5 5 6 6 6 7 7
Small (34) 0 1 3 2 7 9 13
Doshokia Big & Medium (9) 6 6 6 7 7 9 9
Small (34) 0 1 0 2 4 7 7
Chinakhola Big & Medium (9) 6 6 7 7 8 8 8
Small (34) 0 0 0 1 1 3 5
Ar-Alea Big & Medium (9) 3 3 4 4 5 5 5
Small (34) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Akondopara Big & Medium (9) 4 4 5 6 6 6 6
Small (34) 0 0 1 1 2 2 3
Paikpara Big & Medium (9) 3 3 4 4 5 5 5
Small (34) 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Koijuri Big & Medium (9) 5 5 6 7 7 8 7
Small (34) 1 0 0 0 0 4 5
Gopalpur Big & Medium (9) 3 4 5 5 5 6 6
Small (34) 0 1 3 5 5 4 6
Pathrail Big & Medium (9) 7 7 7 8 9 9 9
Small (34) 5 5 7 7 10 11 15
Mongolhor Big & Medium (9) 6 7 8 8 8 8 9
Small (34) 0 0 1 2 3 3 5
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Table 6 exhibits physical characteristics of survey villages in Pathrail union. This set of 
information was obtained from Module 2 (village questionnaire, by FGD consensus). 
Explanations for the terms in the table are as follows: 2006 borrmem is the number of borrowed 
member cases in the village in year 2006, this is the last complete year of information that we 
have, so we can consider this number as an indication of size of the village microcredit market 
(we assume each village has a separate microcredit market). The term pctuseele is for percentage 
of households in the village using electricity (note that every village here has electricity, but not 
every household uses it). The next term dispakaras is for distance from paved road (in 
kilometers), considered a negative characteristic for a village microcredit market. There are some 
more remoteness indicators, all implying negative characteristics for village microcredit market; 
these are as follows: disunionp (distance from union parishad), disupzsad (distance from upazila 
sadar), disbank (distance from bank) and disbazar (distance from bazaar).      
      
Table 6 Physical and Market Characteristics of Survey Villages in Pathrail union 
2006
village borrmem pctuseelecdispakarasdisunionpadisupzsad disbank disbazar
Nolshuda 286 90 0.5 0.5 6.5 0.5 4
Shuvki 303 96 0 2.5 8 2.5 4
Bishnupur 138 90 0 2 7 2 4
Tarini 365 70 0.25 2 4 3 6
Bakultola 53 70 0.05 6 15 9 10
Arra 23 85 2 3 3 3 13
Narunda 471 85 0.25 3 9 3 4
Deojan 490 80 0 0.25 6 0.25 0.25
Borotia 215 90 1 2.5 12 2.5 1.5
Kumuria 164 80 1 5 10 5 1
Gadtola 114 92 0.75 1.5 5.5 1.25 1
Bandabari 108 40 0 4 10 4 2.5
Parijatpur 127 75 1 4 9 4 9
Chandi 408 70 0 0.5 7 0.5 4
Doshokia 156 70 0.5 3 8 3 8
Chinakhola 247 80 0.5 1 4 1.5 1
Ar-Alea 40 98 0.25 4 10 2.5 6
Akondopara 84 99 0.125 3 12 3 4
Paikpara 65 90 2 2 12 2 3
Koijuri 247 80 0 2 9 2 3
Gopalpur 137 75 1 1.5 7 1.5 1.5
Pathrail 1030 95 0 0 6 0 5
Mongolhor 500 90 0 1.5 7 1 1  
  
We discuss market situations of some selected villages in the following paragraphs; on 
the basis of descending order of 2006 borrmem, we discuss five villages, such as no. 1 village 
(Pathrail), no. 6 (Tarini), no. 12 (Kumuria), no. 18 (Bandabari) and no. 23 (Arra).   
Pathrail is the largest village in the union in terms of size of microcredit market. It is 
located at the center of the union, and the union parishad headquarters is here. We find an active 
microcredit market here: five large, two medium MFIs and five small were already present in 
2000, by the year 2006, two additional large and ten additional small MFIs have entered the 
market. Surprisingly a total of 24 MFIs were active in this market in 2006. We see intense 
competition among different MFIs: particularly noticeable are average loan amount disbursed 
being offered by Shamajik Sheba Shongothon (Small) and Grameen Bank (Large), often these 
offers were being raised to have higher share in this village market. Number of cases of 
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overlapping, of both household and membership variety, is much higher in this market compared 
to all-village averages. Even though number of additional MFIs entering into this market was the 
highest, the growth rate of number of borrowing member cases was slightly lower compared to an 
all-village average; may be this implies near saturation of this village’s microcredit market.  
Tarini is no. 6 in terms of size of microcredit market; while it is nearly one-third of that 
of Pathrail in terms of 2006 borrmem. It is a comparatively large sized market, and it is close to 
the center in terms of distance. In terms of growth rates of numbers of borrower cases, it is an 
average active market compared to the all-village averages. Till 2005, small MFIs lagged behind 
large MFIs in terms of average loan amount disbursed, but in 2006, small MFIs overtook large 
MFIs, caused by much higher average loan amount being offered by Ananda (Small). There is a 
moderate falling tendency for nominal average interest rates, in some years, small MFI nominal 
average interest rates exceeded those of large MFIs and in other years it was the other way round.  
Kumuria is no. 12 village in terms of size of microcredit market. It is a small sized 
market, away from the center. Two large and two medium MFIs were present in 2000, by 2006 
two additional large and two small MFIs entered this market. Till 2004, large MFI average loan 
disbursed exceeded those offers by small MFI, but in 2005 there was a switch in favor of small 
MFIs which coincided with an upward jump of average loan disbursed offers by Ananda (Small).  
Bandabari is no. 18 village in terms of size of microcredit market. It is a small sized 
market, away from the center. The number of MFIs operating in 2000 was four, whereas the 
number increased up to seven by 2006. Two medium and one small MFI entered into this market. 
Growth rate figures for number of borrowers are similar to all-village averages in this village. 
Small MFIs lagged behind large MFIs in terms of average loan disbursed in all years.  
Arra is the smallest microcredit market in the union. This village is away from the center. 
There was no microcredit operation till 2001; first in 2002 a large MFI (Buro Tangail) and a 
medium MFI (SATU) entered into this market. Small MFIs lagged large MFIs in terms of 
average loan disbursed and their average nominal interest rate figures were higher as compared to 
those for large MFIs. Membership and household overlap numbers is lower in this village as 
compared to all-village averages.   
Overall the union microcredit market sees intense competition among different MFIs, 
particularly in later years. Interestingly aspects of competition differ across villages. Some 
common observations are as follows:  
(a) average nominal interest rates are falling over time,  
(b) average loan disbursed offered by different MFIs differ widely and also across different 
villages,  
(c) competition is more intense and entry of new firms are more common in more economically 
prominent areas, whereas competition is less intense in economically less advanced areas 
and  
(d) areas where competition is more prominent, we notice more cases of household and 
membership overlapping.  
 
Section 6 Econometric Model and Estimation Results  
 
Section 6.1 Economic Model   
We want to analyze determinants of market share of MFIs in village microcredit markets. 
Particularly we would model shares of currently borrowing members in the village microcredit 
market that goes to a particular MFI. Here we will concentrate on data set for year 2006 only. By 
concentrating on 2006 data only we set aside issues of time series and panel data structures as 
well as recall data issues. This time we have a total of 989 observations (each of 43 MFIs in each 
of 23 villages, market share of a MFI in one particular village is zero if it does not participate in 
that village microcredit market, otherwise non-zero). Now we have a large number of zero 
observations (out of 989-- 757 observations are zero and 232 observations are non-zero; all 
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observations are by definition in between zero and one). With such a large number of zero 
observations (zero implies MFI did not participate, non-zero implies it did, this by itself a 
decision variable) -- we have to model our regression in terms of limited dependent variable 
literature, such as the Tobit model (see next section).  
MFIs are competing for shares in the village microcredit market. Nature and outcome of 
this competition would depend on most importantly the characteristics of the product in question; 
that is the loan product as well as the characteristics of the loan provider or some combination of 
both. Characteristics of the loan product includes size of loan disbursed, nominal interest rate to 
be charged on loan in installments, deposit interest rate to be given on deposits, purpose of loan 
for which loan was approved, flexibility of loan approval process (i.e., how much percentage of 
loan demanded are being actually met for by the loan, amount of time and effort for loan 
sanction) as well as prospects of obtaining more loans in the future provided borrowed members 
do not default on this loan. Characteristics of the loan provider includes identity of the loan 
provider (incorporates goodwill, trustworthiness, previous records, overall reputation in the 
market, etc.) and institution size of the loan provider (whether large national, or small local), 
additionally number of years this loan provider is operating in this market (microcredit loans 
typically are provided in a serial basis, small loan graduating into large loan, current loan 
performance leading to scopes in the future). These two sets of characteristics would operate in 
the market to sort out how much share of the market would be achieved by which loan provider. 
In the extreme case of a monopoly market structure, loan provider MFI would not be much 
concerned about loan characteristics since competition is absent. But in a market with increasing 
competitiveness such as this one, loan provider MFI must keep pace with other loan providers in 
terms of specificity of loan products. More customer friendly loan specification is one way firms 
can earn higher share of the market; or long term association in the market would provide them 
with competitive edge over others. One additional way market shares can be increased is by 
providing some unique products in the market, which others do not provide.  
We notice that two products can be considered ‘unique’ in the market by 2006, such as 
the housing loan (loan sanctioned for housing construction, repair or maintenance purposes) and 
the micro-enterprise loan (loan amount higher or equal to TK. 30,000 and provided to a micro-
enterprise, by definition an enterprise with paid non-household labor). Summing over all villages 
in 2006, only 3.08% of total number of loans is sanctioned for housing purposes and in terms of 
total loan disbursed this amount is only 2.88% (average loan size for this is slightly lower 
compared to overall); at the same time, only 4.77% number of loans is sanctioned for micro-
enterprise purpose and this comprises 22.48% of total loan disbursed (average loan size for this is 
much higher compared to overall). Not many MFIs provide this, whereas the second one requires 
considerable financial strength, the first one can be considered unconventional. MFIs that provide 
either or both of these should have competitive advantage in the market.  
The product and provider characteristics that play a role in determination of market share 
include loan amount, interest rate charged, deposit interest rate provided, provision of housing 
and micro-enterprise loans, size of the MFI, years of operation of the MFI in that particular 
market, etc. Other unobserved characteristics that we do not have quantifiable data is customer 
relations of staff, rules regarding loan meetings and requirements of attendance, and savings 
schemes, whether strict conditions for peer monitoring exists, etc. Another set of variables are 
associated with specific context of the market, such as village characteristics, some of these are 
observed while some of them are not observed-- we can use dummy to capture these effects.  
One more issue to explore is that some of the loan characteristics are co-determined, such 
as loan amount and interest rate charged on loan. Interest rates charged by an MFI do not vary by 
villages, but it varies across MFIs. Figure 6 is a scatter plot of this, and we do notice an upward-
sloping pattern between average loan disbursed and  
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Figure 6 Scatter Plot of All-Village Average Loan Disbursed and Average Nominal 
Interest Rate Charged by MFIs, 2006    
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average nominal interest rate charged. Large MFIs are providing lower average loan disbursed 
tied with smaller interest rates, while small MFIs are providing both categories: higher average 
loan amount tied with higher nominal interest rates and in some cases lower average loan amount 
tied with higher nominal interest rates (medium MFI categories are in between). The fact that 
different categories of combinations exist gives support for the claim that the market is actually a 
segmented market. We do not see a logical downward-sloping pattern between nominal interest 
rates (price) and amount of loan disbursed (quantity), since each MFI is charging same interest 
rate no matter the amount of loan disbursed, rather we see some MFI opt for lower segment (low 
price and low quantity) and some others opt for upper segment (high price and high quantity); and 
if opportunity arises, some opt for in-between (high price and low quantity)11.  Since this market 
is segmented, customers would opt for any one of these two packages: for example, they can opt 
for a package of high loan amount and high interest rate, or they a package of low loan amount 
and low interest rate. Within the same MFI, customers are not allowed to exhibit downward-
sloping pattern: interest rates are invariant with amount of loan within a specific MFI because of 
institutional restrictions.  
 
Section 6.2 Econometric Specification  
 
Section 6.1 specifies that we estimate a Tobit regression. This Tobit regression is for a kind of 
limited dependent variable such that it is roughly continuous over strictly positive values but is 
                                                 
11 The third category of combination of high price and low quantity, occasionally observed in the data and 
in only a few cases, is not expected to last for long as competition increases.  
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zero for a nontrivial fraction of the population. Let y be a variable that is continuous over strictly 
positive values but that takes on zero with positive probability.    
The Tobit model is defined as a latent variable model: 
y*= β0 + x β + u, u| x ~ Normal (0, σ2) …. …….. ………. ……….. …………………..(1) 
y = max (0, y*) …… …….. ……. …….. …….. …….. ……. …… …………………...(2) 
The latent variable y* satisfies the classical linear model assumptions-- it has a normal, 
homoskedastic distribution with a linear conditional mean. From equation (2) we find that the 
observed variable y equals y* when y*≥0, but y=0 when y*<0. Since y* is normally distributed, y 
has a continuous distribution over strictly positive values (see Wooldridge (2000) and Greene 
(2000))12.  
Based on discussion in Section 6.1, we propose the following specification for our model 
of market share of borrowed members:  
[Market share of borrowed members at village i by MFI j] =  
function of [{loan product characteristics of MFI j} + {loan provider characteristics of MFI j}  
        + {village characteristics of village i}] ……. …….. …….. …….. ……… … (3) 
In equation (3), the dependent variable is “market share of borrowed member in a village 
microcredit market in 2006”.  Loan product characteristics can best be captured by a set of 
variables such as “average loan disbursed”, “loan interest rate” and “deposit interest rate”. Since 
average loan disbursed and loan interest rates can be considered as co-determined, we proceed 
with one of them, but not both. We thereby choose “average loan disbursed” and also a square 
term of “average loan disbursed”. MFIs can augment member shares in the market by providing 
larger loan amount, at the same time, this increase may not be linear throughout the entire range 
and we expect concave pattern to the curvature: MFIs can augment market shares by increasing 
average loan disbursed, but at a decreasing rate. Therefore expected sign of coefficient of average 
loan disbursed is positive and that of square of average loan disbursed is negative. Deposit 
interest rates are also included in this category, with expected positive sign for estimated 
coefficient. Loan provider characteristics include variables such as “size of MFI” (captured by 
dummies as “large” and “medium”, taking “small” as base) and “years of operations” (of the MFI 
in the village market). We take a square term of years of operation to capture curvature shape of 
the membership share graph with respect to MFI’s involvement in the local microcredit market. 
Being “large” and “medium” should help in gaining shares, since loan financing is easier with 
national-level MFIs and at the same time, they have gained considerable renown. With regards to 
loan product characteristics, there is a second set of variables which can also play some role in 
determining member market share, such as unique products of a MFI which few other MFI has 
matched in the market (i.e., loan for housing purposes and micro-enterprise loan). We do expect, 
providing these characteristics would help MFIs to gain in additional shares; however these gains 
need not be as prominent as direct gains from raising average loan size or deposit interest rates.  
We proceed with following specification in Tobit regression:  
[market share of members of MFI j in village i, >0 to 1 if MFI j participates, 0=if not] = 
   β0  
+ β1 [average loan disbursed by MFI j in village i] 
+ β2 [square of average loan disbursed by MFI j in village i] 
+ β3 [average deposit interest rates by MFI j in village i] 
+ β4 [dummy for “large”, 1 if MFI j is a “large” MFI, otherwise 0] 
+ β5 [dummy for “medium”, 1 if MFI j is a “medium” MFI, otherwise 0] 
+ β6 [years of operation of MFI j in village i]  
+ β7 [square of years of operation of MFI j in village i]  
                                                 
12 We use STATA version 10 for obtaining maximum likelihood estimates for Tobit model. 
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+ β8 [amount of total loan disbursed for housing purposes of MFI j in village i]   
+ β9 [amount of total micro-enterprise loan disbursed in village i by MFI j] 
+ ∑ βvill i [dummy for villages (a total of 22 dummies)]  
+ error 
 
Section 6.3 Estimation Results 
 
Table 7 presents the regression estimation results. The Tobit specification incorporates the 
provision that not all MFIs operate in every single village micro credit market. In case a particular 
MFI does not participate, its’ share in the market for borrowed members is zero. The dependent 
variable is mktshr_mem (because of large number of observations at zero value, the mean value in 
data is small; it is 2.3% with a large standard deviation at 6.7%).  
The dummy independent variable large has a statistically significant coefficient; this is 0.051 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard error of 0.009 and p-value of 0.000. This implies that 
compared to the base case of a small MFI, a large MFI is estimated to have a 5.1% higher share 
of the village borrowed member market controlling for all other factors. We need to keep in mind 
that this region has been first targeted by large category MFIs and entry of small MFIs has been 
much later, thus there is still a statistically significant advantage of being a “large” MFI rather 
than being a “small” MFI. In contrast the dummy medium does not exhibit statistical significance, 
implying that the estimated gain from being a “medium” rather than a “small” one in terms of 
member share is not large. The value of the F-test for joint significant test of variables large and 
medium is 15.44 and p-value for the significance test is 0.000; this implies these variables are 
statistically jointly significant at 1% level.      
The second set of independent variables consists of yrsofop and yrsofopsq. We expect that as the 
time period of MFI participation grows in the market, so will grow the size of their respective 
client group through social networking among micro credit borrowers. Whereas a new MFI will 
find it difficult to get some borrowing members, an old MFI in a locality will have some reliable 
clients by the course of time. Nature of the micro credit product is such that relationships between 
client and provider firm is expected to last for a long time and is expected to create more and 
more opportunities for both sides as time progresses. Thus we expect a statistically significant 
positive sign for yrsofop and we keep a square term to check whether there is a quadratic pattern 
in this relationship. In the model estimation we find yrsofop to be statistically positively 
significant at 5% level, but yrsofopsq not to be significant; again we find joint statistical 
significance of these two variables together (the F-test value is 37.93 at p-value of 0.000). The 
estimated coefficient value for yrsofop is 0.006, thus implies that an additional year of operation 
in a village is estimated to increase share of borrowed members in the village for a typical MFI by 
0.6%, and significant quadratic pattern does not exist.  
The third set of independent variables consists of avglndisbbyk, avglndisbbyksq and depint. 
Product characteristics terms such as average loan disbursed (in thousand taka) and deposit 
interest rates distinguish the micro credit product that is being offered by the MFI. We find 
average loan disbursed to be expectedly statistically positively significant with coefficient value 
at 0.027 and at p-value at 0.000. The square term of average loan disbursed is found to be and 
expectedly the sign of the coefficient is negative with value with very small value. The additional 
member market share that can be obtained by an additional 1,000 taka average loan size can be 
calculated as:  
∆ mktshr_mem/ ∆ avglndisbbyk = 0.027 − 2× (0.001) × avglndisbbyk  
At mean value of avglndisbbyk (2.789), this amount is 0.021; therefore at mean value of average 
loan share an additional Tk. 1,000 average loan amount would increase member share of a typical 
MFI by 2.1% (there is a concave shape to it, so the slope is positive but increasing at a decreasing 
rate), holding all other variables constant. The joint significance test also gives evidence that 
these two terms are jointly statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for deposit interest   
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Table 7 Estimation Results from Tobit Regression
 
Tobit Regression with Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Errors (N=989) 
dependent variable:       
mktshr_mem   Heterosked.- 
independent variables:  Coefficient Robust p-value 
     Stan. Error   
large   0.051*** 0.009 0.000 
medium   0.011 0.013 0.422 
yrsofop   0.006** 0.003 0.020 
yrsofopsq  0.000 0.000 0.570 
avglndisbbyk  0.027*** 0.004 0.000 
avglndisbbyksq  −0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
depint   0.009*** 0.002 0.000 
lnamnthousebyk  0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
melnamntbyk   0.000 0.000 0.710 
constant   −0.223*** 0.031 0.000 
village dummies      
       
F(31, 958)= 24.22  
Joint significance 
tests: F-test value  p-value 
(Prob>F=0.000)  large & medium F(2,958)=15.44  0.000 
σ = 0.066   yrsofop & square  F(2,958)=37.93  0.000 
(s.e. of σ = 0.006)   avglndisb & squr. F(2,958)=24.10  0.000 
Observation summary:   lnamth. & melna. F(2,958)= 12.26  0.000 
757 left-censored observations at mktshr_mem<=0    
232 uncensored observations  all village dummy F(22,958)=3.80  0.000 
0 right-censored observations     
        
Marginal effects after Tobit (at mean):     
y= Fitted Values (predict)      
 = −0.127       
        
For comparison, OLS with same specification and robust standard errors: 
R-squared= 0.707, F (31, 957)= 22.38, Prob.>F= 0.00     
Note: *** implies significance at 1% level, ** implies significance at 5% level  
         and * implies significance at 10% level    
rate has turned out to be expectedly positive and statistically significant at 1% level. 
The fourth set of independent variables consists of unique product characteristics terms such as 
village-wise total loan amount disbursed for housing purposes (lnamnthousebyk) and micro-
enterprise loan amount (melnamntbyk). The estimated coefficient for lnamnthousebyk is 0.001 
with p-value at 0.000 and this is statistically positively significant, thereby an additional TK. 
1000 disbursed in the village for housing loan purposes would increase member market share for 
a typical MFI by 0.1%; while estimated coefficient for micro-enterprise loan disbursed did not 
exhibit statistical significance. Again these two variables have been found to be jointly 
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statistically significant. Thus there is a scope for MFIs to increase member share by bringing in 
innovative product designs; interesting point is that actually housing loans are close to or even 
smaller than an average loan, but simply the loan sanction for this purpose has created difference 
in member shares of the market.  
The fifth set of independent variables is the village dummies (not reported). For some villages the 
p-values of estimated coefficient for dummies are less than 0.1, and for some others this is higher. 
If we conduct a joint significance test of all village dummies, we find that these dummies are 
jointly significant; village-specific characteristics are overall important in determination of MFI 
member shares.   
 
Section 7 Conclusion 
 
The discussion of a particular area for an in depth investigation for features of microcredit market 
is the central theme of the present paper. Through this exercise we wanted to observe the 
directions to which the microfinance industry in Bangladesh is heading for. Because of selection 
of a seasoned place for microcredit, actually this need not be taken for being representative for 
entire Bangladesh. The survey area is actually one old place for microcredit, and what we observe 
here may at most be taken as indicative of future directions of entire Bangladesh. While keeping 
these considerations, we conclude with some notes on the microcredit market, and these are as 
follows. 
 
Firstly, large and small MFIs are competing side by side in most of the places, not necessarily 
eliminating each other. Since the start of the 2000s, near monopoly of early years of only a few 
leading national-level MFIs have now been replaced by a plethora of MFIs working in the 
microcredit market. One feature of the market is that many new and small MFIs have started their 
operations very recently and competing successfully with more experienced MFIs.   
 
Secondly, MFIs are competing in some selected markets aggressively with instruments at their 
disposal, such as large loan offer, higher deposit interest rate, loans more responsive to local 
specifics, loans with unique characteristics such as housing and micro-enterprise loans, household 
overlapping, membership overlapping; while these same MFIs are not competing aggressively in 
some other markets-- this behavior pattern is based on decisions made in the respective head 
offices, financial strength and staff capacity of the MFIs, characteristics of the market, such as 
economic prospect and low distance from important locations, presence of other MFIs, etc. There 
is a tendency among MFIs to concentrate in some already proven territories (such as regions with 
overall satisfactory economic prospects or well-developed communication networks), whereas the 
reverse is true for economically backward and/or remote areas.  
 
Thirdly, overlapping is one instrument of competition in the microcredit market; regions of more 
intense competition are typically the same regions with more overlapping cases. Therefore the 
issue of overlapping needs to be analyzed within the broader framework of all the instruments of 
market competition in the microcredit market. 
 
Fourthly, if the geographic concentration into most economically prospective areas by the MFIs is 
found to be widespread throughout the whole country, there is a cause of concern for poverty 
alleviation objectives of microcredit movement. This would imply that economically backward 
regions would be intentionally overlooked by the MFIs in their desperate search for being 
competitive in the market (regional and/or national).  
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Annex 1: Normalized Herfindahl Index for Microcredit Market of NGO-MFIs in 
                              villages of Pathrail, 2000 to 2006 
 
vill 1   2   3   4   
year H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem
2000 0.16 0.11 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.42 0.32
2001 0.18 0.08 0.35 0.27 0.36 0.19 0.36 0.31
2002 0.13 0.07 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.34 0.26
2003 0.10 0.08 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.14 0.34 0.24
2004 0.13 0.11 0.32 0.26 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.13
2005 0.08 0.10 0.30 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.19 0.08
2006 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.09
vill 5  6  7  8   
year H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem
2000 0.57 0.40 n.a. n.a. 0.19 0.15 0.36 0.30
2001 0.54 0.40 n.a. n.a. 0.14 0.12 0.34 0.30
2002 0.56 0.54 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.31 0.24
2003 0.35 0.40 0.88 0.44 0.16 0.15 0.29 0.22
2004 0.59 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.12 0.10 0.26 0.23
2005 0.43 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.20
2006 0.32 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.19
vill 9  10  11  12   
year H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem
2000 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.43 0.22
2001 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.25 0.16
2002 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.23 0.20
2003 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.26 0.15
2004 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.28 0.19
2005 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.24 0.17
2006 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.14
vill 13  14  15  16   
year H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem
2000 0.11 0.07 0.30 0.30 0.14 0.07 0.56 0.37
2001 0.11 0.07 0.35 0.33 0.11 0.06 0.48 0.32
2002 0.08 0.06 0.32 0.25 0.08 0.04 0.50 0.28
2003 0.08 0.10 0.20 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.43 0.21
2004 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.32 0.21
2005 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.33 0.19
2006 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.23 0.16
vill 17  18  19  20   
year H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem
2000 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.12 0.26 0.23
2001 0.28 0.26 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.14
2002 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.24 0.22
2003 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.26
2004 0.18 0.12 0.29 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.26 0.27
2005 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.25 0.22
2006 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.18
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vill 21 22 23  All 
Village 
All 
Village 
year H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem H*ln H*mem
2000 0.34 0.46 0.24 0.20 0.37 0.29 0.31  0.25 
2001 0.58 0.55 0.24 0.17 0.36 0.25 0.29  0.22 
2002 0.51 0.43 0.19 0.15 0.30 0.23 0.25  0.19 
2003 0.47 0.36 0.15 0.13 0.28 0.23 0.22  0.18 
2004 0.36 0.28 0.17 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.20  0.18 
2005 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.17  0.15 
2006 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.14  0.13 
    
Note. Normalized Herfindahl index (H*) value ranges between zero and one. The formula for  
         this is H*= (H − 1/N)/(1 − 1/N)  (here H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and N is 
the number of firms in the market). Normalized Herfindahl uses H (HHI) in the formula 
which is simply computed as H= ∑si2   (sum of squares of market shares of each firm, i , in 
the industry, this i is from 1 to N). A small H* value indicates a competitive industry with 
no dominant players, whereas a large value indicates higher concentration in the industry 
         (see wikipedia discussion of Herfindahl-Hirschman index) 
         Here, H*ln is value of normalized index in the market for loan amount in the village, 
whereas H*mem is value of normalized index in the market for members in the village.   
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Annex 2: Member shares and loan shares of all MFIs in the microcredit market across all 
villages in Pathrail union, 2000-2006 
 
SL. Name of MFI MFI type 2000 2000 2001 2001 2002 2002
mem sh loan sh mem shloan sh mem shloan sh
1 SSS Medium 13.42 12.78 12.60 12.69 12.73 12.53
2 SATU Medium 6.04 4.46 7.25 5.33 9.06 6.24
3 DORP Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 ASA Large 2.49 1.53 3.02 2.01 2.84 2.03
5 BRAC Large 4.80 2.62 5.06 3.02 5.51 3.37
6 Grameen Bank Large 49.07 55.15 46.72 53.36 41.33 48.57
7 PROSHIKA Large 0.44 0.40 0.60 0.64 0.41 0.43
8 BRDB Large 6.13 4.38 6.49 4.96 7.16 5.82
9 PDBF Large 0.18 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.18 0.16
10 AGAMI UNNAYAN SOCIETY Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 BURO TANGAIL Large 14.31 14.98 14.42 15.11 15.16 15.27
12 PAD Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 SONALY VOBESSOT Small 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.10
14 SUCHONA Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 ONUKUL Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 ONORD Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.12
17 SHEBA ARTHO Small 0.09 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.03
18 SHEKOR Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 ANANDA Small 0.18 0.06 0.53 0.18 0.47 0.18
20 PROFULLO Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 CHIRUTSHREE Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 JOJONA Small 0.53 0.32 0.60 0.34 1.36 0.86
23 NIRAPOD SOMAJ Small 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.05
24 SAMAJIK DAYITTO Small 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.12
25 NOTUN SATHI Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 SPD Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
27 SRABONTI Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01
28 SOBUJ CHATA Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
29 SHANTI UNNAYAN Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 ANANTA Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
31 SHAMAJIK SHEBA Small 0.98 1.87 1.28 1.25 1.72 2.97
32 DELDUAR UPAKENDRO Small 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07
33 TOMA Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03
34 POROSH Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01
35 MAUSH Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
36 USHA Small 1.07 1.06 0.83 0.77 1.01 0.93
37 AGRONI SOMAJ Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
38 TAT SHILPI KALYAN Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
39 BESHDO Small 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.08
40 UNNMESH Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
41 BRISTI Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
42 SOMONNITO UNNAYAN Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
43 SHUCHI O ECONOMIC BANK Small 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Annex 2: Member shares and loan shares of all MFIs in the microcredit market across all 
villages in Pathrail union, 2000-2006 (Continued) 
 
SL. 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 Avg. Avg.
mem sh loan sh mem shloan sh mem sh loan sh mem shloan sh mem sh loan sh
1 12.02 12.50 11.09 13.25 10.11 13.10 10.34 12.70 11.76 12.79
2 9.29 7.51 8.65 7.72 8.42 7.82 8.56 8.33 8.18 6.77
3 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
4 3.14 2.62 5.94 3.91 6.59 4.52 8.47 5.94 4.64 3.22
5 5.87 3.88 6.66 5.42 7.61 6.72 7.45 7.49 6.14 4.65
6 40.04 45.28 38.88 42.60 34.41 37.88 31.00 33.55 40.20 45.20
7 0.37 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.39 0.37
8 7.17 6.03 6.38 5.59 8.08 6.53 6.69 5.98 6.87 5.61
9 0.14 0.09 0.32 0.19 0.27 0.19 1.07 0.59 0.32 0.20
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
11 15.67 14.65 14.02 13.00 13.40 12.05 12.86 11.00 14.26 13.72
12 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03
13 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.19 0.16 0.09 0.06
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
16 0.32 0.33 0.76 0.71 0.96 0.98 0.95 1.30 0.45 0.49
17 0.14 0.07 0.22 0.13 0.29 0.24 0.38 0.33 0.20 0.14
18 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
19 0.65 0.27 0.66 0.41 1.45 1.17 2.51 2.75 0.92 0.72
20 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.13 0.38 0.25 0.38 0.38 0.14 0.11
21 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.92 0.49 0.75 0.48 0.26 0.15
22 1.80 2.35 1.86 2.22 2.30 2.49 2.25 2.94 1.53 1.64
23 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.52 0.35 0.12 0.09
24 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.54 0.26 0.75 0.53 0.27 0.15
25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
27 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.40 0.51 0.57 0.63 0.18 0.21
28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.00
30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01
31 1.80 2.85 1.90 2.68 1.65 2.74 1.91 2.69 1.60 2.44
32 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
34 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03
35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00
36 0.97 0.79 1.17 1.03 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.70 0.98 0.88
37 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
38 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.27 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.11 0.10
39 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.06
40 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.03
41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
42 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
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Annex 3: Average Loan Size and Average Nominal Interest Rates Charged by MFIs across all 
the villages in Pathrail union, 2000- 2006 
 
SL. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 SSS Avg Loan 7437.09 8491.02 8565.12 9388.46 10803.42
1 SSS Avg Int Rate 14.96 14.87 14.77 12.78 12.69
2 SATU Avg Loan 5764.71 6203.12 6000.00 7298.51 8065.69
2 SATU Avg Int Rate 14.66 14.92 14.87 15.10 12.70
3 DORP Avg Loan 6000.00
3 DORP Avg Int Rate 20.00
4 ASA Avg Loan 4785.71 5625.00 6208.33 7529.41 5957.45
4 ASA Avg Int Rate 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 14.99
5 BRAC Avg Loan 4259.26 5044.78 5322.58 5968.50 7355.45
5 BRAC Avg Int Rate 14.87 14.91 14.92 14.95 14.99
6 Grameen Bank Avg Loan 8777.17 9636.83 10230.52 10207.85 9902.76
6 Grameen Bank Avg Int Rate 10.45 10.39 10.28 10.31 10.21
7 PROSHIKA Avg Loan 7000.00 8875.00 8928.57 8750.00 7222.22
7 PROSHIKA Avg Int Rate 13.29 12.93 11.64 11.39 12.34
8 BRDB Avg Loan 5579.71 6441.86 7074.38 7600.00 7915.84
8 BRDB Avg Int Rate 7.86 7.90 8.21 8.91 8.45
9 PDBF Avg Loan 5000.00 5000.00 7666.67 5833.33 5500.00
9 PDBF Avg Int Rate 11.80 12.50 12.11 12.71 10.69
10 AGAMI UNNAYAN SOCIEAvg Loan
10 AGAMI UNNAYAN SOCIEAvg Int Rate
11 BURO TANGAIL Avg Loan 8173.91 8845.57 8771.48 8438.05 8376.13
11 BURO TANGAIL Avg Int Rate 19.52 19.44 19.51 19.49 19.17
12 PAD Avg Loan 2000.00 7500.00
12 PAD Avg Int Rate 19.60 16.33
13 SONALY VOBESSOT Avg Loan 5000.00 5000.00 4000.00
13 SONALY VOBESSOT Avg Int Rate 19.60 17.62 15.13
14 SUCHONA Avg Loan
14 SUCHONA Avg Int Rate
15 ONUKUL Avg Loan
15 ONUKUL Avg Int Rate
16 ONORD Avg Loan 6000.00 9285.71 8500.00
16 ONORD Avg Int Rate 20.00 20.00 20.00
17 SHEBA ARTHO Avg Loan 10000.00 3666.67 4000.00 4666.67 5428.57
17 SHEBA ARTHO Avg Int Rate 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
18 SHEKOR Avg Loan 5000.00
18 SHEKOR Avg Int Rate 20.00
19 ANANDA Avg Loan 2500.00 2928.57 3375.00 3785.72 5523.81
19 ANANDA Avg Int Rate 12.00 12.44 12.00 12.00 12.00
20 PROFULLO Avg Loan 5285.71
20 PROFULLO Avg Int Rate 20.00
21 CHIRUTSHREE Avg Loan 6250.00
21 CHIRUTSHREE Avg Int Rate 14.40
22 JOJONA Avg Loan 4666.67 4750.00 5478.26 11743.59 10762.71
22 JOJONA Avg Int Rate 18.21 20.00 19.58 18.05 17.43
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Annex 3: Average Loan Size and Average Nominal Interest Rates Charged by MFIs across all 
the villages in Pathrail union, 2000- 2006 (Continued) 
 
SL. 2005 2006 Mean Comments
1 Avg Loa 12996.69 13410.18 8886.62 Sharply increasing
1 Avg Int R 12.70 12.49 12.03 Falling
2 Avg Loa 9318.83 10634.41 6660.91 Sharply increasing
2 Avg Int R 12.59 12.67 12.44 Falling
3 Avg Loa 25000.00 25000.00 14000.75 Entry year was low amount, then very high lev
3 Avg Int R 20.00 20.00 15.75 No fluctuations
4 Avg Loa 6881.36 7660.53 5581.47 Increasing
4 Avg Int R 14.76 14.79 13.57 Stable, slight fall in later years
5 Avg Loa 8853.37 10986.28 5974.40 Sharply increasing
5 Avg Int R 14.93 14.83 13.67 Stable
6 Avg Loa 11045.09 11826.60 8954.10 Gradual increase
6 Avg Int R 10.41 10.21 9.78 Stable, slight fall in later years
7 Avg Loa 9666.67 8176.47 7328.24 Overall increasing trend, with fluctuations
7 Avg Int R 13.67 13.68 11.99 Fluctuating tendency
8 Avg Loa 8100.83 9773.32 6561.74 Increasing
8 Avg Int R 8.57 8.62 8.32 Increasing, with fluctuations
9 Avg Loa 7083.33 5983.87 5259.52 Fluctuations
9 Avg Int R 10.27 11.16 11.28 Fluctuations
10 Avg Loan 10000.00 5005.00 Observed once
10 Avg Int Rate 12.50 11.25 Observed once
11 Avg Loa 9027.50 9344.88 7623.57 Fluctuations, upward tendency in later years
11 Avg Int R 15.23 15.02 17.30 Fluctuations, downward tendency in later year
12 Avg Loa 6750.00 9750.00 5202.40 Sharply increasing
12 Avg Int R 16.74 16.88 16.31 Falling
13 Avg Loa 6400.00 9181.82 4932.47 Upward tendency in later years
13 Avg Int R 15.53 16.70 16.26 Upward tendency in later years
14 Avg Loa 25000.00 4000.00 9671.33 Fluctuations
14 Avg Int R 3.96 15.00 10.99 Fluctuations
15 Avg Loan 5000.00 2507.50 Observed once
15 Avg Int Rate 15.00 15.00 Observed once
16 Avg Loa 10232.56 14945.46 8163.29 Sharply increasing
16 Avg Int R 19.93 19.95 19.31 Stable
17 Avg Loa 8461.54 9318.18 5694.83 Fluctuations
17 Avg Int R 15.00 15.00 15.25 Stable
18 Avg Loa 4500.00 3300.00 3204.50 Falling
18 Avg Int R 20.00 20.00 19.50 Stable
19 Avg Loa 8084.62 11958.62 4771.92 Sharply increasing
19 Avg Int R 12.03 12.07 12.94 Stable
20 Avg Loa 6588.24 10818.18 5678.03 Sharply increasing
20 Avg Int R 20.00 19.77 19.94 Stable
21 Avg Loa 5414.63 7069.77 4688.85 Fluctuations
21 Avg Int R 14.18 14.03 15.90 Falling
22 Avg Loa 10883.49 14238.46 7818.15 Sharp increases, with fluctuations
22 Avg Int R 15.17 14.87 18.16 Fluctuations
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Annex 3: Average Loan Size and Average Nominal Interest Rates Charged by MFIs across all 
the villages in Pathrail union, 2000- 2006 (Continued) 
 
SL. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
23 NIRAPOD SOMAJ Avg Loan 3000.00 5000.00 8000.00 10000.00 15000.00
23 NIRAPOD SOMAJ Avg Int Rate 20.00 20.00 20.00 17.50 17.50
24 SAMAJIK DAYITTO Avg Loan 7000.00 4500.00 3000.00 2600.00
24 SAMAJIK DAYITTO Avg Int Rate 17.50 18.06 17.50 17.50
25 NOTUN SATHI Avg Loan
25 NOTUN SATHI Avg Int Rate
26 SPD Avg Loan
26 SPD Avg Int Rate
27 SRABONTI Avg Loan 2000.00 11500.00 12400.00
27 SRABONTI Avg Int Rate 20.00 15.65 15.97
28 SOBUJ CHATA Avg Loan
28 SOBUJ CHATA Avg Int Rate
29 SHANTI UNNAYAN Avg Loan
29 SHANTI UNNAYAN Avg Int Rate
30 ANANTA Avg Loan
30 ANANTA Avg Int Rate
31 SHAMAJIK SHEBA Avg Loan 14909.09 8205.88 15068.96 14282.05 12766.66
31 SHAMAJIK SHEBA Avg Int Rate 17.55 17.50 17.50 17.95 17.12
32 DELDUAR UPAKENDRO Avg Loan 8000.00 10000.00 5000.00
32 DELDUAR UPAKENDRO Avg Int Rate 17.00 17.00 15.00
33 TOMA Avg Loan 5000.00
33 TOMA Avg Int Rate 15.00
34 POROSH Avg Loan 2000.00 4000.00 4500.00
34 POROSH Avg Int Rate 15.00 15.00 15.00
35 MAUSH Avg Loan
35 MAUSH Avg Int Rate
36 USHA Avg Loan 7750.00 7818.18 8058.82 7380.95 7945.95
36 USHA Avg Int Rate 15.23 15.53 15.34 15.30 15.50
37 AGRONI SOMAJ Avg Loan 4000.00
37 AGRONI SOMAJ Avg Int Rate 20.00
38 TAT SHILPI KALYAN Avg Loan 5000.00 20000.00
38 TAT SHILPI KALYAN Avg Int Rate 17.50 17.00
39 BESHDO Avg Loan 4500.00 6000.00 7500.00 10000.00
39 BESHDO Avg Int Rate 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
40 UNNMESH Avg Loan 6000.00 6000.00
40 UNNMESH Avg Int Rate 20.00 20.00
41 BRISTI Avg Loan
41 BRISTI Avg Int Rate
42 SOMONNITO UNNAYAN Avg Loan 5000.00
42 SOMONNITO UNNAYAN Avg Int Rate 15.00
43 SHUCHI O ECONOMIC B Avg Loan
43 SHUCHI O ECONOMIC B Avg Int Rate
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Annex 3: Average Loan Size and Average Nominal Interest Rates Charged by MFIs across all 
the villages in Pathrail union, 2000- 2006 (Continued) 
 
SL. 2005 2006 Mean Comments
23 Avg Loa 6500.00 7366.67 6861.21 Fluctuations
23 Avg Int R 15.00 14.93 18.49 Falling
24 Avg Loa 4833.34 7736.05 4241.91 Fluctuations
24 Avg Int R 17.50 17.20 18.46 Fluctuations
25 Avg Loan 4000.00 2012.50 Observed once
25 Avg Int Rate 13.13 19.06 Observed once
26 Avg Loan 2000.00 1013.00 Observed once
26 Avg Int Rate 30.00 28.00 Observed once
27 Avg Loa 12722.22 12090.91 8456.69 Sharply increasing
27 Avg Int R 16.49 16.95 18.68 Falling
28 Avg Loa 6500.00 10000.00 5509.33 Sharply increasing
28 Avg Int R 15.00 15.00 19.33 Stable
29 Avg Loan 6000.00 3014.50 Observed once
29 Avg Int Rate 15.00 22.00 Observed once
30 Avg Loan 5000.00 2515.00 Observed once
30 Avg Int Rate 15.00 22.50 Observed once
31 Avg Loa 16662.16 15413.64 12167.43 Sharp fluctuations
31 Avg Int R 17.62 17.62 19.23 Stable
32 Avg Loa 10000.00 6606.40 Fluctuations, but increasing
32 Avg Int R 17.00 19.60 Stable
33 Avg Loan 2516.50 Observed once
33 Avg Int Rate 24.00 Observed once
34 Avg Loa 5833.33 8800.00 4194.56 Sharply increasing
34 Avg Int R 15.14 15.00 18.19 Stable
35 Avg Loan 5000.00 2517.50 Observed once
35 Avg Int Rate 12.50 23.75 Observed once
36 Avg Loa 9634.15 8686.27 7163.79 Fluctuations, with increasing tendency
36 Avg Int R 15.07 15.26 17.90 Stable
37 Avg Loan 4000.00 2679.00 Stable
37 Avg Int Rate 18.13 25.04 Falling
38 Avg Loa 9166.66 9560.00 8752.93 Fluctuations, with increasing tendency
38 Avg Int R 17.13 17.02 21.33 Stable
39 Avg Loa 12333.33 6728.72 Sharply increasing
39 Avg Int R 15.00 19.00 Stable
40 Avg Loa 15000.00 18750.00 9158.00 Sharply increasing
40 Avg Int R 20.00 20.34 24.07 Stable
41 Avg Loa 4000.00 8000.00 4013.67 Sharply increasing
41 Avg Int R 20.00 20.00 27.00 Stable
42 Avg Loa 8000.00 8500.00 5385.50 Sharply increasing
42 Avg Int R 15.00 14.12 21.53 Falling
43 Avg Loan 10000.00 5021.50 Observed once
43 Avg Int Rate 15.00 29.00 Observed once
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